Strengthening The Long-Term Resilience Of Subnational Authorities In Countries Affected By The Syrian And Iraqi Crises

The large increase in population since the Syria crisis began is putting public institutions under extreme pressure to deliver basic services to an increasingly high number of vulnerable people. In a context of shrinking national resources, this is testing the limits of infrastructure and public services that were already fragile before the crisis.

Seven years on and the reality of the response on the ground in most affected regions indicate that sub-national authorities are yet to play a consistently effective role in guiding the response and in coordinating and tracking the diverse range of interventions being implemented by a multitude of actors including de-concentrated sector service providers, international aid organizations, civil society and the private sector.  This reality is resulting in a significant level of inefficiency and redundancy in the delivery of much needed aid and in numerous cases, in the misguided targeting of valuable interventions.  It also represents a missed opportunity to affect a longer-term process of development of sub-national systems of governance and the coherence of the distribution of roles and responsibilities among sub-national tiers of administration or government and between them and central ministries that in most cases, continue to hold the bulk of the mandate for the delivery of most basic social and economic services and infrastructure.

 Iraq

The economy of the KRI which kept the Syrian refugees employed since 2011 has severely shrunk since 2014 when investment stopped following ISIS occupation of Mosul, leaving minimum livelihood opportunities for displaced families. In addition to this, fighting to retake Mosul from the ISIS has triggered significant further displacement.

 

A policy of free movement in and out of the camps and the facilitation of work permits allow refugees to freely pursue employment opportunities. This has led to similar rates of employment of both host and refugee communities: 32% aged 16-59 are employed and 57% of men and 6% of women are employed according to a survey made in four camps. Unemployment and under employment increased affecting more refugees and especially women, 100% of households with at least one family member with disability reported unemployment. In terms of job compositions, more than 50% of host communities are employed by the Government, while the same percentage of the refugees is self-employed. Of major concern is the significant increase in competition for available jobs, especially in camps in Erbil and Dohuk where the highest number of refugees and IDPs are sheltered. Distance to job location and discrimination were found minor factors as proved by the 13% of camp and 30% of host communities who have established businesses in relation to the needs of the camp.

 Poverty is increasing in the whole country, but at a higher rate in ISIS-affected governorates including the KRI. Microsimulation estimates suggest a reversal of the hard-won welfare gains of the past, with poverty rising in overall Iraq from 19.8% in 2012 to 22.5% in 2014. Poverty was accompanied by a massive human capital deficit; in health, education and access to basic services. Many Iraqis live close to the poverty line, vulnerable to increases in the price and availability of necessities, and/or the loss of assets and livelihoods. According to the World Bank projections, the number of people living below the poverty line was 2.8 million at end 2014. IDPs make up half a million of Iraq’s poor in 2014, with an estimated poverty rate of 40%, almost twice the average. The KRI experienced a quadrupling of poverty rates and increased competition for jobs, goods and services.

 Infrastructure was also severely impacted and affected in the KRI by the influx of IDPs and refugees. Between October 2012 and September 2014, the additional demand for water for IDPs and refugees is estimated at 11% and the KRI needs to meet an additional estimated total water demand of 17.1 million square meters per year. The sharp increase in demand for water has not been accompanied by investments in water and wastewater infrastructure. Sanitation remains a major concern, most notably in IDP camps. The major gaps relate to physical facilities, namely, the lack of wastewater treatment plants. The lack of sanitation increases public health risks and environmental pollution.

 Based on the rapid needs assessments and field surveys conducted by UN-Habitat, the majority of vulnerable IDPs and Syrian refugee families live in over-crowded rented houses of urban neighbourhoods without tenure security or basic safety, structural and sanitary standards. While some of the IDPs were able to stay temporarily with their relatives or to rent apartments, massive numbers of IDPs are still in need of shelter and basic services. As addressed in the Iraq Humanitarian Response Plans 2015, 2016 and 2017, the number of IDPs in some of Iraq’s major cities has now exceeded their original population, putting host communities under severe pressure. Inadequate housing conditions contribute to significant protection needs, endangering women and girls. Women, men, girls, and boys face increased vulnerability to sexual and gender-based violence in insecure shelter conditions without doors and locks. Exposure to risk and feelings of vulnerability are pervasive among refugees and IDPs, especially for women and adolescent girls of reproductive age. These women and girls also have specific needs related to menstruation and cultural norms of modesty which often are not met in existing shelter conditions. This could significantly hinder early recovery efforts and further deteriorate the socio-economic wellbeing of the displaced and local populations, as well as leading to social tensions and public discontent, potentially resulting in additional widespread social unrest and violence.

 

Even among IDPs who are willing to return, several factors prevent or delay the return, including damage to housing, poor access to basic services, deterioration of community cohesion and security, limited economic opportunities, and disputed land and property claims. In Sinjar, aside from widespread physical destruction and the presence of unexploded ordinances, lack of proper documentation on housing, land and property rights has been preventing many IDPs from settling back in their former properties, some of which have been in the meanwhile usurped, as highlighted by assessments conducted by UN-Habitat.  

 The proposed project was designed in coordination with both the Federal Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government, and priorities are determined against needs assessment conducted at the end of 2016.

 

Lebanon

The Urban Dimension of the Crisis

Syrian refugees are located throughout Lebanon due to the absence of official camps; 87% of them live in 251 localities (in certain municipalities they outnumber local residents) and in these same localities reside 67% of the Lebanese poor population. By mid-2017, it was estimated that 74% of refugees fall under the poverty line and 58% cannot meet survival minimum expenditures.

 

Between 2014 and 2017, the percentage of Lebanese who did not report any inter-community tensions dropped from 40 to 2 percent. Competition for jobs, political and cultural differences, and pressure on resources and utilities are the top three sources of tensions. 94% of Lebanese respondents agree that the presence of Syrian refugees in Lebanon is placing too much strain on resources. Areas identified as most vulnerable in the 251-vulnerability map, which include all large cities of Lebanon and their suburbs, consistently suffer from less access to services, more insecurity, higher levels of tensions and more exposure to violence than non-vulnerable areas.

 

Local Authorities and a More Resilient Response

Within this context, municipalities have a critical role to play in the country’s response to the impact of the Syria crisis and there is growing intention to engage more municipalities at the services as well as at the social cohesion levels. However, this will require increased funding and empowered human resources at municipal level, as well as enhanced collaboration and communication with central and subnational government. 70 percent of municipalities are too small to provide basic services pre-crisis, 57 percent lack an administrative structure, and 40 percent have only a single employee (often working on a part-time or voluntary basis).

In the absence of a decentralised system, increased interaction between the national and local level will allow for enhanced responsiveness and support by central public institutions and ministries to the needs of municipalities. The response in Lebanon is testing approaches to increase effectiveness of municipalities through enhancing local-regional-national level coordination and improving capacities in a targeted manner. This work is seen as a potential source for informing a future decentralization reform and to strengthen social stability in Lebanon – as recent analysis has also demonstrated that residents' trust in their local authorities is a key component of social stability

Justification/Key Challenges

Despite increasing efforts from national and international actors to largely and actively engage municipalities in the response, municipal performance is hindered by the following key challenges:

 

Highly Centralized System: according to the Law 118/77, municipalities enjoy administrative and financial independence, however in practice, they are bound by the highly confessional and political systems which restrict decision making at the central level.

 

Limited Financial Resources: municipal finance relies mainly on the funds channelled through the Independent Municipal Fund (IMF), controlled by the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (MoIM), and fed from the taxes collected by key public service providers (e.g. electricity, communications, water, etc.) Amounts channelled to municipalities through the IMF are calculated based on a complex formula that considers the number of registered population and the percentage of fees collected annually by municipalities. However, in reality, the size of municipal annual budgets and their liquidity are subject to the availability of cash within the Ministry of Finance. Except for the funds channelled by the central government, municipalities seldom take any initiatives that may enhance local revenues. Moreover, municipalities did not receive increased national revenues to deal with the impact of the Syrian crisis within their localities.

Lack of Skilled Human Resources: insufficient funds and the bureaucracy within the existing systems restrict the ability of municipalities to recruit the necessary technical and administrative personnel. This in turn hinders proper municipal planning and efficient service delivery as it negatively impacts the quality and cost effectiveness of proposal plans and interventions.

Bureaucratic Administrative Process: According to the Lebanese Administrative structure, municipalities fall within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities, for processing their daily business. Municipalities are required to obtain ex-ante approvals from the Qaemaqam, the governor, and the minister according to set expenditure thresholds. This extensive administrative process has been impeding municipalities to meet the needs of their communities in a timely manner and affecting the overall municipal performance and operations.

Overlapping Unclear Mandates: the highly confessional and politicized system in the country has led over the years to overlapping mandates and conflicting responsibilities between municipalities and line ministries, and amongst the ministries themselves. The competition over decision making and the confusion over the scope, scale, and level of work have led to improper planned, cost ineffective, unaligned service delivery systems at the local, subnational and national levels. This was made evident during the response to the Syrian refugee crisis, whereby local and national authorities made contradictory statements in response to proposed solutions and roles clearly overlapped.

The proposed action will build on the already existing context, here refer to section 1.4.2 on complementary actions, and in particular the existing work of UNDP and UN Habitat with regards to Host Communities and Urban populations. However, the overarching intent will be to go one step further than previous interventions and develop capacity, particularly at the sub national level, that will result in Unions of Municipalities and Municipalities being better able to manage the impact of the crisis. The intention is to leverage the investments in a manner that enables systems strengthening and results in stronger, more capable and accountable sub national structures. This is in essence the transformative agenda of the Resilience approach where funding targeting a crisis contributes to longer term change